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This paper investigates the determinants and financial crowding out consequences of non-
financial firms’ holdings of financial assets (FA) including government bonds and securities 
(GS) in Turkey using the firm level data compiled by the Central Bank of the Republic of 
Turkey over the 1990-2004 period. The salient features of the Turkish financial system with 
financial dollarisation and short maturity of financial contracts allowed the corporate sector to 
remain relatively liquid in spite of high inflation persisting until very recently. Consistent with 
the presence of capital market imperfections and financial adaptation, the Turkish corporate 
sector’s transactions-cum-precautionary motive-led holdings of the FA as a financial buffer are 
found to be relatively high and persistent. Contrasting with the transactions-cum-precautionary 
motive based “economies of scale” argument of the trade-off theory, but reflecting a plausible 
argument that financial constraints decrease and the ability to allocate resources into 
financial and real investments increases with firm size, the holdings of FA and GS tend to 
increase with the firm size both for manufacturing industry and other non-financial firms. The 
empirical results based on the one-step robust GMM estimations of DPD models suggest that 
the FA and GS holdings of the corporate sector can be explained by firm-specific 
characteristics including profitability, leverage ratios, asset tangibility and size along with 
macroeconomic condition variables represented by uncertainty and real interest rates on GS. 
The results further suggest that the impacts of these variables significantly vary not only across 
manufacturing industry and other non-financial firms but also between the large, medium and 
small sized firms. Under macroeconomic instability leading to excessively high real rate of 
returns for financial assets, non-financial firms tend to hold FA and GS also for their 
speculative motive. Consequently, financial assets and real investments may become substitutes 
rather than complements leading the former to crowd out the latter. The empirical results from a 
conventional accelerator model of investment augmented with variables representing firms 
financing conditions and PSBR strongly support such a financial crowding out impact of FA 
holdings for large sized manufacturing industry firms. For the small and medium sized firms, 
the positive complementary impact of precautionary and the negative substitution impact of 
speculative FA holdings are found to offset each other. Consistent with the credit view of the 
balance sheet literature, real investments of bank-dependent firms decline with an increase in 
the PSBR potentially due to the fact that government domestic debt is heavily financed via 
banks, which in turn deteriorates the credit availability for the corporate sector. This provides a 
further support to the “expansionary fiscal contractions” literature. The sensitivity of 
investment to cash flow is found to reflect the firms’ profitability and investment opportunities 
which are not fully conveyed by the fundamental Q rather than the degree of financial 
constraints. This paper also argues that the conventional pecking-order and trade-off theories of 
the capital structure literature may not be solely adequate in explaining the non-financial firms’ 
behaviour as financial intermediaries in Turkey. This might be the case also the acceleration of 
the FA holdings of firms in many industrial countries during the last decade in spite of 
declining financial constraints due to deepening international financial integration. An 
alternative but not mutually exclusive approach may be treating firms as facing a choice 
between allocating their resources into financial and real investments. The results of this paper 
provide a strong support to such an approach and suggest that financial investments may be a 
substitute or complementary to real investment depending respectively on whether the 
speculative or transactions-cum-precautionary motive dominates.    
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I. Introduction 
Non-financial (corporate sector) firms hold substantial amounts of liquid financial 
assets
2 (FA) in many countries (Dittmar et al., 2003 and IMF, 2006). According to IMF 
(2006), the recent acceleration in the FA holdings of non-financial firms in the G-7 
countries is one of the striking changes in the global financial landscape. In the 
conventional Modigliani and Miller (1958) world with perfect capital markets, firms 
can raise funds instantaneously to finance their profitable projects and thus they may 
have no uncertainty induced precautionary demand for liquidity. However, as Myers 
and Majluf (1984) and Holmstorm and Tirole (2000) argue, the presence of capital 
market imperfections including the informational constraints and asymmetries, credit 
rationing and moral hazard create a demand for liquid assets. In fact, non-financial 
firms tend to hold FA including government securities (GS) to hedge themselves 
against liquidity and interest rate risks and maturity mismatches in an imperfect capital 
market environment. 
There is now a growing body of theoretical and empirical literature attempting to 
explain the firms’ demand for liquid FA
3. The most liquid financial asset in the firms’ 
portfolio is their instant cash balance (cash in hand and demand deposits with the 
commercial banking system) the demand for which can be explained by the 
conventional transactions (Tobin, 1958) and precautionary (Miller and Orr, 1966) 
motives. The firms’ cash holdings, in this context, reduce transactions costs and provide 
a buffer to absorb adverse shocks (Keynes, 1936). Not only the cash balances but also 
alternative liquid assets including interest bearing bank deposits and short-term 
securities can provide a financial buffer to absorb unexpected changes in transactions 
and investment opportunities. Higher uncertainty concerning macroeconomic stance 
can also lead firms to hold more short-term FA instead of allocating all their resources 
into long-term capital investments.  
 
                                                 
2 In this paper, “liquid financial assets” refers to currency, deposits with the commercial banking 
system and short-term securities including government bonds and securities, commercial paper, and 
certificates of deposits. Data availability often precludes the inclusion of some other liquidity sources 
such as bank lines of credits. In the literature, liquid financial assets are often referred shortly to as 
“cash”  which may not be the best approach especially when it is intended to differentiate the motives 
for holding currency and interest bearing short term assets. 
3 The recent contributions include Kim et al. (1998), Opler et al. (1999), Holmstorm and Tirole (2000), 
Dittmar et al. (2003), Almeida et al. (2004, 2006), Özkan and Özkan (2004), IMF (2006) and Baum et 
al. (2006).    3
The recent studies, the bulk of which are based on the trade off and pecking order 
theories of the capital structure literature, consider capital market imperfections and 
information asymmetry induced financial constraints and suggest firm specific 
characteristics including the firms’ size, growth opportunities, profitability, cash flow 
uncertainty to explain the transactions-cum-precautionary motive of holding liquid FA. 
The transactions-cum-precautionary motive per se, however,  may not adequately 
explain the recent acceleration of the excessive FA holdings of non-financial firms in 
many countries. Alternatively, non-financial firms are in a position of allocating their 
resources among real and financial investments, as risk factors need to be carefully 
considered in a competitive market given variety of financial choices (Vickers, 1987 
and Holmstorm and Tirole, 2000). By providing the necessary liquidity services due to 
the transactions-cum-precautionary motive, liquid FA can be complementary to real 
investments. In this context, liquid FA including government securities may crowd in 
real investments (Woodford, 1990 and Holmstorm and Tirole, 1998). However, under 
macroeconomic instability and thus high uncertainty leading to excessively high real 
rate of returns for FA, non-financial firms may prefer to defer real investments and hold 
FA also for their speculative motive. In such a case, FA and real investments may 
become substitutes thus the former may crowd out the latter.  
This paper attempts to contribute to this growing literature by investigating the 
determinants and implications of non-financial firms’ holding of FA in Turkey using 
the firm level data compiled by the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey (CBRT) 
over the 1990-2004 period. The Turkish economy, until very recently, can be 
characterised as suffering from macroeconomic instability and severely high inflation 
persisted more than three decades. The economy indeed witnessed two financial crises 
(in 1994 and 2001) with severe output contractions during the period. Under these 
conditions, as reported by Aydın et al. (2006), non-financial firms in Turkey have been 
heavily exposed almost all of the basic balance sheet risks including excessively high 
leverage ratios, relatively lower asset tangibility, severely high liability dollarisation 
and very short debt maturity. The corporate sector can also be characterised as suffering 
from a general financial constraint as the Turkish bank-based financial system, the 
deepening of which is very low even when compared to those of the countries with 
similar development levels, tends to finance public sector deficits with it’s rather 
limited sources (Aydın et al., 2006). These salient features of the Turkish economy   4
apparently makes it more interesting to investigate the causes and consequences of the 
corporate sector FA holdings and compare with the growing related empirical literature, 
the bulk of which are based on advanced industrial countries’ data.  
The plan of the rest of the paper is as follows. In section II, we discuss the 
potential determinants of corporate sector liquid FA including government securities. 
This section considers also the case for a speculative motive for FA holdings, under 
which the complementarity of the conventional transactions-cum-precautionary motive-
led financial investments and real investments may become blurred. Section III presents 
the data and evaluates some descriptive statistics for some key firm-specific variables 
postulated to explain the FA holdings of the corporate sector. Section IV empirically 
investigates the causes of the manufacturing industry and other non-financial firms’ 
holdings of liquid FA and government securities. In Section V we estimate a 
conventional accelerator model of investment augmented with variables representing 
firms financing condition and PSBR (public sector borrowing requirement) for the 
manufacturing firms. The results of the investment equations for different firm size 
categories are also interpreted in the context of presence of financial constraints, the 
impact of speculative-led motive holdings of FA and the extent of financial crowding 
out by government borrowing. Finally, Section VI concludes.  
  
II. The Determinants of Corporate Sector Liquid Financial Assets 
Non-financial firms hold substantial and recently accelerating amounts of liquid 
FA in many countries. Consequently, the causes and consequences of the corporate 
sector FA holdings has become a central issue of the corporate finance literature. The 
earlier literature focused mainly on the conventional transactions and precautionary 
motives for demand for money, the seminal papers for which are provided Tobin 
(1956) and Miller and Orr (1966). Recent studies, including Kim et al. (1998), Opler et 
al. (1999), Dittmar et al. (2003) Özkan and Özkan (2004), and IMF (2006) suggest that 
the corporate FA holdings can be explained also in the context of the two main 
alternative but not mutually exclusive theories of the capital structure literature: the 
trade-off and pecking-order theories.  
Consistent with the basic postulations of the conventional demand for money 
literature, the trade-off theory suggests that there is an optimal liquidity ratio target for 
the firms determined by the relative costs and benefits of liquid FA. While the   5
opportunity cost of holding liquidity is the difference between the expected returns on 
FA and productive investments, the benefits are obtained from the liquidity that 
provides firms with a financial buffer against unexpected cash flows and investment 
opportunities, i.e. the precautionary motive. Consequently, the FA holdings of firms 
can be expected to increase with their growth opportunities and cash flow uncertainty 
and to decrease with their accessibility to capital markets (Kim et al. 1998 and Opler et 
al.  1999). The trade-off theory also argues that there is an economies of scale in 
liquidity so that FA holdings tend to decrease with firm size (Opler et al., 1999).  
In the Modigliani and Miller (1958) world with perfect capital markets, there may 
be no uncertainty induced precautionary demand for liquidity when all firms can raise 
funds instantaneously to finance their profitable projects. The starting point of both the 
trade off and pecking order theories based explanations is indeed credit market 
imperfections due to asymmetric information between borrowers (firms) and lenders. 
According to the pecking-order theory (Myers and Majluf, 1984; Myers, 2001), the 
presence of asymmetric information makes external finance costly leading firms to 
prefer internal over external finance that is subject to a premium resulting from 
informational problems. Consequently, consistent with the trade-off framework, firms 
hold FA as a precautionary financial buffer against unexpected cash flows and investment 
opportunities. As the informational asymmetry and the consequent financial constraint 
can be expected to decrease with firm size, smaller firms may have higher tendency to 
hold liquid FA. Considering the reasonable argument that larger firms have a greater 
access to capital markets, the negative relationship with firm size and FA holdings 
postulated by both the trade-off and pecking-order theories may be interpreted as 
observationally equivalent albeit arising from the two distinct postulations
4.  
In contrast to the trade-off theory, the pecking order theory based explanations 
maintain that the firms have no optimal liquidity ratio target which is invariant to their 
internal cash flows and profitability. Instead, higher profitability and cash flows allow 
the firms preferring internal finance to increase their liquid asset holdings as a financial 
                                                 
4 This is consistent with the view that the distinction between the trade-off and pecking-order based 
postulations “is not as clear-cut as one might want” (Opler et a.l, 1999, p.14).  These two main 
alternative theories often make similar postulations about the determinants of the firms’ capital 
structure, making it difficult to compare them empirically.    6
buffer
5. Consequently, larger firms with higher profitability may be expected to hold 
more financial assets. This, however, may make the information asymmetries induced 
financial constraint based postulation that liquid FA holdings decrease with the firm 
size blurry if profitability is not controlled.  
The recent studies, the bulk of which are based on the trade off and pecking order 
theories of the capital structure literature, suggest firm specific characteristics including 
the firms’ size, growth/investment opportunities, profitability and cash flow uncertainty 
to explain the transactions-cum-precautionary motive of holding liquid FA. For 
example, Kim et al. (1998) and Opler et al. (1999) consider a sample of US companies 
and find that firms with smaller size, stronger growth opportunities and more volatile 
cash flows hold larger amounts of liquid FA. Dittmar et al. (2003) focus on corporate 
governance characteristics and find a negative relation between shareholder protection 
and cash holdings for a sample of firms from 45 countries. In the same vein, Özkan and 
Özkan (2004) find a negative non-monotonic relationship between managerial 
ownership and liquid FA holdings of the UK firms.  The results by Özkan and Özkan 
(2004) are broadly consistent with those in Kim et al. (1998) and Opler et al. (1999) 
except the finding that firm size is statistically insignificant for the UK case.  
The benefits and costs of holding FA may not be invariant to the firms’ capital 
structures. Therefore, some key capital structure variables including leverage ratio, 
asset tangibility and debt maturity composition may also be postulated as important 
determinants of the firms’ demand for liquid FA. Leverage ratio may be interpreted as a 
proxy for the ability of firms to issue debt. Furthermore, the cost of funds used to invest 
in liquidity tends to increase with leverage ratio (Kim et al., 1998). The consequent 
negative relationship between leverage ratio and FA holdings may however become 
blurry if we consider the plausible case that higher debt levels can increase the 
likelihood of financial distress (John, 1993) and thus the precautionary demand for 
liquidity. Asset tangibility can mitigate contractibility problem and the firms with more 
tangible assets can be expected to be less financially constrained as they may have 
greater access to external funds (Almeida and Campello, 2006 and IMF, 2006). In this 
context, the transactions-cum-precautionary demand for FA can be expected to 
                                                 
5 This may be consistent with the fact that non-financial firms in the G-7 countries have preferred to 
use their substantially increased profits to acquire FA or to repay debt, rather than to finance new 
capital investments since the early 2000s (IMF, 2006).    7
decrease with asset tangibility. Short-term debt forces the firm to be more liquid whilst 
long term debt allows the firm to be more flexible against liquidity shocks (Holmstorm 
and Tirole, 2000). Furthermore, debt maturity tends to decrease with higher degree of 
informational asymmetry (Flannery, 1986) supporting the postulation that firms with 
more short-term debt may be expected to hold more liquid assets.  
The firms’ demand for FA may crucially be determined also by the macroeconomic 
conditions under which they operate. The relative real rates of returns on productive 
investments and financial assets, in this context, may be postulated as an opportunity 
cost variable to explain firms’ FA holdings. The essence of the precautionary demand 
for FA is the uncertainty that firms may face with. Until very recently, the conventional 
literature appears to focus solely on firm-specific variables like cash flow volatility as a 
measure of own (intrinsic) uncertainty and does not explicitly take into account 
macroeconomic conditions under which the firms operate. However, as Baum et al. 
(2006) argue, liquid FA holdings of firms may be positively related with market 
(extrinsic) uncertainty represented by the level and volatility of macroeconomic 
variables including real output and inflation. Macroeconomic instability and uncertainty 
can lead to excessively high real interest rates for FA including government securities. 
In such a case, as will be further discussed in the following section, non-financial firms 
may prefer to defer real investments and hold FA also for their speculative motive.  
Non-financial firms can also be viewed to face a choice between allocating their 
resources into real and financial investments (Vickers, 1987, Ersel and Sak, 1997 and 
Holmstorm and Tirole, 2000). By providing the necessary liquidity services due to the 
transactions-cum-precautionary motive, FA can be complementary to real investments 
as suggested by the conventional capital structure theories. In this context, the holding 
of liquid FA including government securities can crowd in real investments (Woodford, 
1990 and Holmstorm and Tirole, 1998). However, under macroeconomic instability and 
thus high uncertainty, non-financial firms may prefer to defer real investments and hold 
FA with relatively higher expected real returns also for their speculative motive. In such 
a case, FA holdings and real investments may become substitutes leading the former to 
crowd out the latter
6,7. In this context, the firms’ demand for FA are determined by the 
mixes of their transactions-cum-precautionary and speculative motives.  
                                                 
6 Such a financial crowding-out behaviour under uncertainty is neatly emphasized by Vickers (1987): 
“Money may be held when the uncertainties surrounding economic prospects make it desirable to defer   8
The empirical literature using firm-level data often does not explicitly take into 
account the role of government debt instruments in the firms’ financial asset portfolios. 
Government domestic debt finance can either alleviate or relax the firms’ financial 
constraints by draining the available resources in the economy or by providing liquidity 
services, respectively. A well-developed government debt market is often interpreted as 
helpful for development of a corporate bond market as it can provide the necessary 
market infrastructure and investor base along with a reliable benchmark yield curve 
(IMF, 2005a,b). Government securities, especially those with short maturities, provide 
liquidity services and can be used as financial collateral. As Woodford (1990) and 
Holmstorm and Tirole (1998) convincingly show, government debt as net wealth may 
thus crowd-in private investment by relaxing liquidity constraint in non-Ricardian 
economies with imperfect financial intermediation. However, these beneficial affects of 
the government debt may not be invariant to financial depth and to the level (thus the 
sustainability) and the mode of finance of public debt itself. High levels of government 
borrowing from domestic markets can drain limited sources that would be available for 
private investment. This financial crowding out affect might be expected more severe 
for bank dependent firms when the public debt is financed through the commercial 
banking system
8. The lack of an adequate financial depth can create or amplify the 
crowding out problem as substantially large shares of public debt in the domestic 
financial system can decrease the overall liquidity with increasing the country risk 
premium and thus reducing capital inflows (Caballero and Krishnamurthy, 2004). In 
                                                                                                                                                          
the commitment of resources to real investment and the pursuit of real economic activities. To the extent 
that this is so, available real resources will not be utilized as fully as would othervise be possible” (p. 11). 
In the same vein, Ersel and Sak (1997) propose the notion of uncertainty induced liquidity preference to 
explain corporate sector holding of liquid FA including government securities as a financial  buffer under 
conditions of enhanced uncertainty.  Accordingly, the “distribution of the working capital between 
production related assets and financial assets depends upon perceived risks over the production cycle of 
the corporation” (p.4). The financial crowding out, according to Ersel and Sak (1997), is temporary as 
firms transfer the accumulated FA to finance real investments to the next production cycle.  The 
empirical results by Ersel and Sak (1997) support the uncertainty induced liquidity preference hypothesis 
for the Turkish data and suggest that non-financial firms holding of government securities not only 
cushioned the impact of the 1994 crisis but also allowed them to have a faster post-crisis recovery.  
7 The argument about the crowding out affect of the FA holdings of non-financial firms may also be 
relevant for the recent US experience. According to IMF (2006, p. 136), the recent acceleration of the 
corporate sector holdings of FA “has offset one-half of the increase in government and household net 
borrowing, thereby helping to mitigate the impact on the external deficit”. IMF (2006) also find that non-
financial corporate sector in the G-7 countries accelerated their FA holdings rather than to finance new capital 
investments during 2001-2004.  
8 Financial deepening and banking system development can potentially limit the crowding out affect 
(Caballero and Krishnamurthy, 2004). However, as Kuttner and Lown (1999) shows, bank holdings of 
public debt tend to displace lending to the non-bank private sector even in a country like the US with 
well developed financial markets.     9
such a case, fiscal contractions can be expansionary as they alleviate the credit 
constraint of firms.  
III. Financial Asset Holdings of Non-Financial Firms in Turkey: Some Stylised 
Facts 
The Turkish economy, until very recently, might be characterised by severely high 
inflation rates persisted more than three decades, extremely volatile economic growth and 
potentially unsustainable budget deficits financed through mainly the domestic 
commercial banking system with very high real interest rates. The economy indeed 
witnessed two financial crises (in 1994 and 2001) with severe output costs during the 
period. Under these conditions, as reported by Aydın et al. (2006), non-financial firms in 
Turkey have been heavily exposed almost all of the basic balance sheet risks including 
excessively high leverage ratios, relatively lower asset tangibility, severely high liability 
dollarisation and very short debt maturity. The firms can also be characterised as suffering 
from a general financial constraint as the Turkish bank-based financial system, the 
deepening of which is very low even when compared to those of the countries with 
similar development levels, tends to finance public sector deficits with it’s rather limited 
sources (Aydın et al., 2006).  
The causes and consequences of the FA holdings of the corporate sector operating 
under such salient features of the Turkish financial system may be viewed as a natural 
research topic to be empirically investigated. To this end, we utilize the firm level 
database compiled by the CBRT over the 1990-2004 period. We apply a number of 
sample selection criteria on our original sample of around 160.000 firm-years. First, we 
restrict our sample to non-financial firms as the behaviour and capital structure of 
financial institutions under financial regulation are not comparable with those of non-
financial firms. From the sample of non-financial firms, we marked non-positive values of 
total assets, firm-level sample mean employment and net sales as missing. To obtain 
comparable results, missing firm-year observations for any key firm-specific variable 
considered in Table 1 during the sample period were dropped. Finally, from these firms, 
only those with at least three time series observations during the sample were chosen. 
These criteria have provided us around 75.000 non-financial firm-years, with an average 
of about 5000 firms per annum. Around half of the firm-year observations belong to 
manufacturing industry firms. Consistent with the BACH (The Bank of Harmonised Data 
on Company Accounts) scheme, we classified the firms as small if their sample means of   10
net sales or total assets are not larger than EUR 7 millions. The firms with sample means 
of net sales or total assets are larger than EUR 40 millions are classified as large whilst 
the rest apparently constituting the medium sized firms. Table 1 presents descriptive 
statistics for the means of the main firm-specific variables used in our analysis.   
Figure 1 plots the shares of FA (FAS) of manufacturing industry (Man) and other 
non-financial (ONF) firms in total assets (TA) during 1990-2004. The figure also presents 
the shares of government securities (GS) in TA (GSS) during the period. According to 
Figure 1, the FAS and GSS of manufacturing industry firms tend to be smaller than those 
for the ONF firms. The differences are statistically significant as suggested by the tMan 
statistics reported by Table 1. The firms’ FAS and GSS sharply increased with the 
financial crisis of 1994 and tend to remain relatively high until 2001. After the 2001 
financial crisis, on the other hand, FAS and GSS appear to be gradually declining. The 
sharp increase in the FAS during the inter crises period (1994-2001) may be interpreted as 
being largely due to the shift in their GS portfolios. This preliminary evidence lends a 
support to the view that non-financial firms hold FA and GS also for their speculative 
motive under macroeconomic instability and thus high uncertainty.  
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FAS (Man. Firms) FAS (ONF Firms) 
GSS (Man. Firms) GSS (ONF Firms) 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for the Key Firm-Specific Variables 
 All  NF 
Firms  Man. Firms   Man. Small  Man. 
Medium  Man. Large  ONF Firms   ONF Small  ONF 
Medium  ONF Large 
N  74461 35741 21009 10901 3831  38720 27756 8003  2961 
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tMan = 0.33 
5.06 (0.288) 













Notes: N is the number of firm-year observations.  The values in parentheses are the standard errors for the tabulated sample means of the variables.  All the ratios are 
expressed as the % of the total. tS and tM  are the absolute value of the t-test statistic for the hypothesis that the mean value of the variable for the sample group defined 
by the column is not different from that of the small (S) and medium (M) sized firms, respectively.  tMan is the absolute value of the  t-test statistic for the hypothesis 
that the mean value of the variable for the sample group defined by the column is not different from that of the manufuctaring industry (Man) firms with the same size 
category. ** and * denotes the null hypothesis is rejected at the 1 % and 5 % levels, respectively.    12
The FA holdings of the non-financial firms in Turkey can be interpreted as roughly 
comparable with many industrial countries when compared internationally
9. However, the 
firms’ holdings of cash in hand (typically less than 0.5% of their total assets) have been 
minimal during the period. Under substantially high inflation rates sustained during the 
most of the period until very recently, economic agents, including non-financial firms, can 
be expected to minimise their cash (and non-interest bearing demand deposits
10) holdings. 
A sustained severe inflationary process in a country may not only preclude domestic fiat 
money demanded as a store of value, but may also reduce its role as a medium of 
exchange with the availability of alternative liquid financial assets which can be used as 
an inflation hedge whilst providing liquidity to a certain extent. This may plausibly 
explain the minimal holdings of cash by the firms. However, the fact that FAS of the 
Turkish firms is roughly comparable with those for the countries enjoying much lower 
inflation and stronger macroeconomic policy stance needs a further explanation.  
The salient features of the Turkish financial system may be helpful in explaining the 
liquid FA holdings of the corporate sector. Under substantially high inflation and 
macroeconomic instability, the maturity of financial contracts, including government 
securities and banking system time deposits, have been extremely short in Turkey (Koğar 
and Özmen, 2006). This financial adaptation allowed the corporate sector to hold interest 
bearing FA also for their liquidity services. Furthermore, the Turkish banking system is 
heavily dollarised with foreign exchange (FX) denominated deposits constituting around a 
half of the total deposits during the period (Yılmaz, 2005 and Akıncı, Barlas-Özer and 
Usta, 2006). Consequently, non-financial firms in Turkey have been able to hedge 
themselves against currency risk to a certain extent whilst remaining relatively liquid also 
by holding FX deposits with the banking system (asset dollarisation).  
                                                 
9 For example, Baum et al. (2006) report that US and Germany corporations hold around 10% and 6% of 
their total assets in liquid FA (cash and marketable securities), respectively. Dittmar et al. (2003) consider a 
cross-section of firms from 45 countries and find that the median ratio of liquid FA to net assets (total assets 
minus cash and marketable securities) is  6.6 %. The median liquid FA ratio reported by Dittmar et al. 
(2003) for some selected countries are as follows: 3.1% (Chile), 6.4% (US), 7.3% (Brasil), 7.4% (Germany), 
8.1% (UK), 11.1% (France), 13.4% (Turkey), 15.5% (Japan), and 20.9% (Israel). In the same vein, 
Himmelberg et al. (2003) consider a cross-section of firms from 27 European countries and find that the 
mean (median) ratio of liquid FA to net assets is  18.0 % (6.4%). The data sets by Dittmar et al. (2003) and 
Himmelberg et al. (2003) both show that the FA ratio varies widely across (and within) countries. This 
suggests that there may be no optimal liquidity ratio for non-financial firms invariant to industry/firm 
specific characteristics and the prevailing policy stance in the country.   
10 There is no data  for the firms’ holding of demand deposits with banks. However, it may be plausably 
expected that the share of domestic currency denominated demand deposits is minimal as for the cash 
holdings under the severe inflationary period.    13
The capital structures of the firms, including maturity and currency composition of 
their debt, are among the important determinants of their demand for FA. High share of 
short-term debt may make firms be more vulnerable to insolvency and rollover risk 
especially in the case of an interest rate shocks as cash flow must be available for interest 
payments. Consequently, firms’ demand for liquidity may be expected to decrease with 
their debt maturity. Table 1 presents also the maturity structure of the corporate sector 
debt (MAT) measured as the ratio of long-term liabilities to total debt. Accordingly, the 
bulk of the Turkish corporate sector debt appears to be short-term (with maturity less than 
a year). Foreign currency denominated short term debt forces the firm the revenue of 
which is mainly in domestic currency to hold liquid FX assets against a currency risk. As 
reported by Kesriyeli et al. (2005) and Aydın et al. (2006) the corporate sector liability 
dollarisation in Turkey has been severely high with the share of FX denominated debt 
fluctuating around two third of total debt during the period. Under these conditions, the 
opportunity costs of remaining liquid by holding TL cash and TL denominated demand 
deposits have been very high in the face of the sustained high inflation rates during the 
most of the period until very recently. The short maturity of the financial contracts and 
asset dollarisation under financial adaptation to high inflation and macroeconomic 
instability, however, allowed the firms to hold alternative liquid FA making them to be 
less vulnerable to shocks.  
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics also for some other firm-specific variables 
which are amongst the potentially most important determinants of the corporate sector FA 
holdings. Manufacturing industry firms appear to have relatively lower leverage ratios 
(LR, measured as debt over total assets) than the other non-financial (ONF) firms. 
Consistent with the view that large firms tend to prefer internal funds and small firms may 
more likely to be financially constrained (Myers and Majluf, 1984), the medium sized 
firms appear to have the highest leverage ratios. The large sized manufacturing firms have 
significantly smaller LR compared to the others during the period. For both 
manufacturing and ONF firms, the debt maturity (MAT) improves with firm size as 
expected. Asset tangibility which is a proxy for the collateral (COL, defined as the ratio 
of net tangible fixed assets to total assets) levels of the firms is significantly higher for 
manufacturing firms than the ONF firms. The collateral ratios appear to be monotonically 
increasing with the size of the manufacturing firms. For the ONF firms, on the other hand, 
large sized firms have significantly lower asset tangibility than the small and medium   14
sized firms
11. The large sized firms have the highest profitability ratios (PROF, as 
measured by return on assets) whilst the manufacturing firms tend to be more profitable 
than the ONF firms.   
An important preliminary result from Table 1 is that FAS and GSS tend to increase 
with the manufacturing industry firm size. For the ONF firms, a similar picture arises 
except the case that the FAS of medium and large sized are not statistically different from 
each other. The positive relationship between the firm size and FAS contrasts with the 
presence of an economies of scale in liquidity postulation of the trade-off theory. The 
evidence may not be supporting also the pecking-order theory based explanation that 
larger firms tend to hold less FA as they are less likely to suffer from an information 
asymmetry induced financial constraint. However, as already discussed, the postulations 
about the firm size and FAS relationship may become blurry under the pecking-order 
theory postulation that firms have no optimal liquidity ratio target which is invariant to 
their internal cash flows and profitability. Accordingly, higher profitability and cash flows 
allow the firms preferring internal finance to increase their liquid asset holdings as a 
financial buffer. In this context, the evidence suggesting that the large sized firms with 
higher profitability hold more FA may indeed be interpreted as lending a support to the 
pecking-order theory which controls for profitability
12.  
The positive relationship between the firm size and FAS may be argued to need a 
further explanation beyond the conventional view that firms hold FA only for transactions 
and precautionary motives under information asymmetries induced financial constraints. 
Alternatively, FA may be viewed not only as a financial buffer against liquidity shocks 
but also as a portfolio choice substituting real investments due to their higher real rate of 
return under macroeconomic uncertainty. The large sized firms have higher ability to 
allocate their resources into financial and real investments as they are less financially 
constrained. The preliminary evidence from the Turkish corporate sector data is consistent 
with such a speculative-cum-precautionary motive. This speculative motive appears to be 
                                                 
11 Note that, in Turkey, considerably large part of the corporate sector debt (around 25%) is in the form of 
trade credits which does not directly rely on collateral (Yalçın et al., 2005 and Aydın et al. 2006).  Yalçın et 
al. (2005) find that the share of trade credits increases with the manufacturing industry firm size. This is 
consistent with the view that  trade credit becomes an important complement to bank credits especially for 
the collaterally poor firms with credit constraints (Aydın et al., 2006). Consequently,  the collateral ratios 
may better be related to bank credits rather than the leverage ratio per se.  
12 This may be consistent with the fact that non-financial firms in the G-7 countries have preferred to use 
their substantially increased profits to acquire FA or to repay debt, rather than to finance new capital 
investments since the early 2000s (IMF, 2006).    15
rather limited for the smaller firms as they are relatively less flexible for holding FA for 
interest income apart from their liquidity under their heavier financial constraints. 
Consistent with their speculative-led motive, the ratio of interest income to operating 
profits
13 (INTINC) tends to be increasing with firm size both for manufacturing and ONF 
firms. During the period, their heavier investment on FA yielded especially large sized 
manufacturing and ONF firms to obtain substantial interest income constituting about 
18% and 25% of their operating profits, respectively.  
 
IV. The Determinants of the Financial Asset and Government Securities 
Holdings of the Corporate Sector 
This section proceeds with the empirical investigation of the determinants of the 
non-financial firms’ holdings of FA in Turkey during the 1990-2004 period using annual 
firm-level data compiled by the CBRT. To this end, we consider the following equation: 
FASit =  α1FASit-1 + βFit  + γMt  + ui + υt + ηit      ( 1 )  
where FAS is the ratio of FA to total  assets (TA), F and M contain firm-specific and 
macroeconomic variables, respectively, with β and γ being the vectors of corresponding 
regression coefficients. In (1), υt and ui are respectively time (t) and cross-section (i) 
specific effects and ηit is a disturbance term. The set of the firm-specific variables (F) 
postulated to explain FAS contains profitability ratio as measured by return on assets 
(PROF), leverage ratio (LR, debt over total assets), asset tangibility as a proxy for the 
collateral (COL, the ratio of net tangible fixed assets to total assets), and firm size (SIZE, 
represented by the log of total sales deflated by the consumer price index)
14. For the 
macroeconomic variables, we consider the Real Sector Confidence Index of the CBRT 
based on business tendency surveys to proxy for decrease in perceived macroeconomic 
uncertainty (CONF) and the real interest rates on government securities (RG) as a 
measure of the own rate of return on FA. To test whether the coefficient estimates do not 
vary across different firm groups, we also estimate (1) augmented with dummy variables 
                                                 
13 It may be preferable to consider alternative measures such as net profits or profits before taxes. 
However, for some observations these alternative measures have substantially high negative values 
precluding a meaningful interpretation of the ratios based on them.   
14 In the preliminary analyses, we considered also the firms’ debt maturity (long-term debt over total debt) 
to explain FA. Potentially due to the fact that the bulk of the corporate sector debt have been short-term  
without a significant variation over time (Table 1 and Aydın et al., 2006) the maturity variable was found to 
be insignificant in all the regressions.    16
(TYPEj) defining the firm size category where dummy variables are interacted with all 
explanatory variables: 
FASit =  α1FASit-1 + βFit  + γMt  + α1j(TYPEj*FAit-1) + βj(TYPEj*Fit)   
  +  γj(TYPEj* Mt)  + ui + υt + ηit       ( 2 )  
In (2) α1, β and γ now give the coefficients for the base category defined by the excluded 
dummy variable whilst α1j, βj and γj give the corresponding differences in the coefficients 
from the base for the category defined by TYPEj.  
Until very recently, the bulk of the empirical literature specified static panel data 
models for the FA holdings and employed the standard fixed/random effects procedures 
for estimation. The static models, often implicitly, maintain that FA holdings 
contemporaneously adjust to changes in their fundamental determinants under perfect 
information with no adjustment cost and the consequent lack of financial adaptation 
leading to hysteresis/persistence. Following the recent literature including Özkan and 
Özkan (2004) and Baum et al. (2006), we specify (1) as to contain also the lagged FASit 
which is consistent with a partial adjustment mechanism (PAM). The PAM may be 
justified under the conventional arguments including the existence of adaptive 
expectations and transactions and adjustment costs. This is consistent also with a target 
adjustment model (Opler et al., 1999) maintaining that firms adjust their asset holdings to 
their target/desired levels. In the same vein, the coefficient of FASit-1 ( α1) can be 
interpreted as to give the adjustment coefficient (λ = 1- α1) implying the ability of firms to 
adjust to their desired/target levels (Özkan and Özkan, 2004). The use of the conventional 
static panel data estimation procedures for the dynamic equation such as (1), however, 
may be misleading as surveyed by Arellano and Honore (2001) and Bond (2002).  
It may be plausibly argued that the firm specific variables are potentially 
endogenous for the evolution of the FA holdings. In this paper, we address the 
simultaneity issue along with the inclusion of the FASit-1 by estimating the equation by 
employing Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) procedures developed for dynamic 
panel data models (DPD) by Arellano and Bond (1991) and Arellano and Bover (1995). 
We maintain that the macroeconomic variables CONF and RG and their interactions with 
dummy variables are strictly exogenous for the evolution of the firms’ FA holdings over 
time. All the firm specific variables (PROF, LR, COL, SIZE) and their interactions with 
dummy variables, on the other hand, are treated as being potentially endogenous.    17
 
 
IV.1. The Determinants of the Financial Asset Holdings  
IV.1.1. All Non-Financial Firms  
We first proceed with the empirical investigation of the determinants of the financial 
asset holdings of the non-financial firms in Turkey. Table 2 reports the results of the one-
step system GMM estimations
15 (Arellano and Bover, 1995 and Blundell and Bond, 1998) 
for the samples of manufacturing industry and other non-financial (ONF) firms using all 
the available t-2 (and earlier) dynamic lags of FASit, PROFit, LRit, COLit,, and SIZEit as 
instruments. As noted by Bond (2002), the maintained endogenous variables should be 
treated symmetrically with the dependent variable, therefore we specify exactly the same 
dynamic lag structure for the instruments for FASit and the firm specific variables. The 
instrument set contains also the current values of the maintained strictly exogenous 
variables CONF and RG. The equations in Table 2 pass all the diagnostics except the 
Hansen-Sargan J-test of overidentification restrictions
16. The consistency of the GMM 
estimators and the validity of instruments crucially depend on the absence of higher-order 
serial correlation in the idiosyncratic component of the error term. If the disturbance in the 
original dynamic levels equation is not serially correlated, there should be evidence of 
significant negative AR(1) and no significant AR(2) in the difference equation (Arellano 
and Bond, 1991). The results for m1 and m2 for the equations therefore suggest the lack 
of serial correlation in the transformed GMM models. Equation (2.1) in Table 2 reports 
the results for the whole sample of firms. The results for the manufacturing industry and 
ONF firms are reported by equations (2.2) and (2.3), respectively.  We also estimated (2) 
for the whole sample defining the generic TYPEj as a dummy variable taking unity for the 
ONF firms. In this equation, the interactions of the firm specific and macroeconomic 
variables with TYPEj are treated as endogenous and exogenous, respectively, and 
                                                 
15 All estimates are performed using Stata 8.2, command xtabond2 by Rodman (2005). 
16 The results for the Hansen-Sargan tests may be interpreted with a caution as their size and power 
properties for the DPD models using the GMM are yet to be adequately established.  Arellano and Bond 
(1991) mention that the Sargan test on the one-step estimation often over rejects the validity of the 
overidentification restrictions. In the same vein, Hoxby and Paserman (1998) show that even a small intra-
group correlation may lead to the rejection of the null too often for the standard overidentification tests. 
According to Bowsher (2002) the Hansen-Sargan test tends to under-reject the null as the number of the 
moment conditions increases for a given N. The notable improvements in the Hansen-Sargan test results for 
the subsample estimations presented in the following sections may be consistent with an argument that the 
properties of the test may not be invariant to the number of moment conditions relative to the sample size 
and the number of groups.    18
therefore the instrument set is defined accordingly. In equation (2.2), tMAN is the t-ratio of 
the corresponding variable interacted with the dummy variable for the ONF firms and 
thus tests whether the coefficients are not significantly different between manufacturing 
industry and the ONF firms.  
According to (2.1), all the variables except the leverage ratio (LR) are significant in 
explaining the corporate sector FA holdings in Turkey during the period.  The statistical 
insignificance of the LR coefficient does not change even when we consider the 
manufacturing industry and ONF samples separately as reported by (2.2) and (2.3). As 
already discussed, the insignificance of the LR may not be surprising as the sign of it is 
not unambiguous. Higher debt levels may indicate better access to financial markets and 
thus lower precautionary demand for liquidity. Furthermore, the cost of funds to invest in 
liquidity increases with debt level and thus a negative relationship between LR and FAS 
may be expected. Higher debt levels, on the other hand, can increase the likelihood of 
financial distress and thus the precautionary demand for liquidity. As will be further 
investigated later in this paper, these offsetting effects of LR on FAS leading to the 
insignificant LR coefficient may change with different firm groupings. 
The FA holdings appear to be relatively persistent as suggested by the significant 
FASit-1 coefficient in (2.1). The estimated FASit-1 coefficients do not vary significantly 
between the manufacturing industry firms and other non-financial firms as reported by 
(2.2) and (2.3). The value of the adjustment coefficient (λ = 1- α1) can be interpreted as 
high (around 0.70) suggesting that the costs of deviating from the desired FA holdings are 
significant. The inertia in the FA holdings is consistent also with the presence of financial 
adaptation as financial contracts involve learning costs implying some stickiness in user 
preferences (Dornbusch et al., 1990). The evidence suggesting that the adjustment is 
rapid, however, may be interpreted as reflecting the higher cost of being out of 
equilibrium relative to the cost of adjustment.  
Consistent with the preliminary evidence presented by Table 1 earlier, the FAS 
significantly increase with the firm size. The size affect appears to be higher for 
manufacturing firms than the ONF firms. The positive relationship between the FAS and 
the firm size contrasts with the trade-off theory postulating that there is an economies of 
scale in liquidity (Opler et al., 1999). In the absence of a precautionary-cum-speculative 
motive, the FAS may be postulated to decrease with the firm size as larger firms may be 
less financially constrained as suggested by the conventional pecking-order theory. The   19
evidence, however, supports the view that neither the pure transactions motive of the 
trade-off theory nor the conventional transactions-cum-precautionary motive of the 
pecking-order theory is solely adequate to explain the corporate sector FA holdings in the 
presence of a speculative motive. When the firms are viewed to be able to substitute their 
investments into financial and real investments, then the empirical evidence may become 
much less puzzling. 
 
Table 2. The Determinants of Financial Asset Holdings: All Firms 
 
































































tMAN = 2.83*** 
N  51857 25350  26507 




W(7) = 768[0.00] 
P[H-S] = 0.00 
m1 = -24.2 [0.00] 
m2 = -1.58 [0.12] 
χ
2
W(7) = 545[0.00] 
P[H-S] = 0.00 
m1 = -18.8 [0.00] 
m2 = 0.00 [1.00] 
Χ
2
W(7) = 523 [0.00] 
P[H-S] = 0.01 
m1 = -16.6 [0.00] 
m2 = 1.25 [0.21] 
Notes: N is the effective number of firm-year observations. The values in parentheses are the coefficient 
standard errors (d.f. adjusted) that are robust to within cross-section residual correlation and 
heteroscedasticity (Arellano, 1987).  *, **  and *** denote the significance at the 10, 5 and 1 %, respectively.   
m1 and m2 are the  Arellano and Bond (1991) tests for first-order and second-order serial correlation, 
asymptotically N(0,1). χ
2
W is the Wald test for the joint insignificance of the explanatory variables, with p-
values given in [.]. P[H-S] reports the p–value of the Hansen-Sargan test for instrument validity and 
overidentification restrictions. tMAN  is the t-ratio to test the hypothesis that the coefficient of the 
corresponding variable is the same for manufacturing industry and ONF firms.  
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The effect of profitability (PROF) on FAS is positive and significant at the 10% 
level for the manufacturing industry firms. The profitability coefficient is positive but 
statistically insignificant for the other non-financial firms. The positive coefficient of 
PROF is consistent with the pecking-order theory suggesting that the firms with higher 
profitability hold more liquid FA as a financial buffer since they prefer internal over 
external finance. This is also helpful in explaining the positive relationship between FAS 
and SIZE as larger firms are also those with higher profitability. To the extent that 
profitability is also a proxy for firms’ growth opportunities, the positive PROF coefficient 
may imply an uncertainty induced precautionary demand for FA to avoid them to miss to 
valuable investment opportunities in some states of nature under credit market 
imperfections. Furthermore, the larger firms with higher access to external financing may 
take advantageous credit market conditions to accumulate financial assets to be used as a 
buffer when external capital is more expensive (Greenwood, 2005 and IMF, 2006). 
We expect a negative relationship between collateral (COL) and FAS as asset 
tangibility can mitigate contractibility problem and thus relax the financial constraint 
leading firms’ transactions-cum-precautionary demand for liquidity to decrease (Almeida 
and Campello, 2006 and IMF, 2006). The negative and significant COL coefficients in all 
the equations in Table 2 are in line with this expectation. The impact of asset tangibility is 
significantly more for manufacturing industry firms than the other non-financial firms. 
For both manufacturing and ONF firms an increase in the perceived confidence in 
macroeconomic conditions (CONF) lead to a significant decrease in the FAS. As an 
increase in the confidence imply a decrease in the macroeconomic uncertainty that the 
firms may face with, the negative CONF coefficient may indeed be interpreted as to proxy 
the impact of uncertainty on the FA holdings due to the precautionary motive. The 
decrease in the precautionary FA holdings with a decrease in macroeconomic uncertainty 
(an increase in macroeconomic confidence) also provides further support to the 
importance of macroeconomic stability in stimulating the efficient allocation of resources.  
 The literature often ignores the role of own rate of return on FA which may be 
justified under a transactions-cum- precautionary demand for liquid assets with no 
significant positive real return argument. As already discussed in Section II, FA may be 
viewed not only as a financial buffer against liquidity shocks but also as a portfolio choice 
substituting real investments due to their higher real rate of return under macroeconomic 
uncertainty. In such a case, the own real return of FA may become a crucial variable to   21
explain the demand for them. Under the severely high inflation rates sustained during 
most of the sample until very recently, the holdings of the fiat cash were almost negligible 
and the presence of very short maturities allowed firms to hold interest bearing FA 
including government securities.  It may, thus, be plausible to consider the real interest 
rates on government securities (RG) as a proxy measure of the own rate of return on FA. 
The results presented by Table 2 strongly support the hypothesis that the demand for FA 
significantly increases with RG. The impact of the RG is significantly higher for the ONF 
firms than the manufacturing firms suggesting that the speculative-led motive may be 
more important for the former.  
The significant and positive impact of RG on FAS lends a support to the view that 
the FAS of firms may not be solely explained by the conventional transactions and 
precautionary motives. When the speculative motive is also taken into account, our 
findings suggesting that the FAS increase with the firm size may become much less 
puzzling. The ability of firms to allocate their resources into real and financial 
investments can be expected to increase with their size as larger firms have better access 
to financial markets and thus less financially constrained. Consequently, consistent with 
our findings, the speculative demand for FA tends to increase with the firm size.   
The literature often does not differentiate manufacturing industry and ONF firms in 
investigating their liquid FA holdings. The results presented by Table 2, however, 
strongly suggest that the impacts of some firm specific variables including profitability, 
leverage ratio and collateral and macroeconomic variables like government bond real 
interest rates may significantly vary between manufacturing industry and ONF firms. 
Following the bulk of the literature, we considered the (log) real assets of the firms as a 
proxy variable for their size in estimating the equations in Table 2. This allowed us to 
investigate (and control for) the impact of the size but provided no information to test 
whether the effects of the firm specific and macroeconomic variables vary with respect to 
the firms’ size classification as small, medium and large
17. In the following two sections, 
we proceed with the investigation of this issue for the manufacturing industry and ONF  
firms, respectively
18.  
                                                 
17 See Section III for the classification of the firms as small, medium and large.  
18 An alternative choice might be interacting the variables with the SIZE proxy. Our preferred approach, 
however, allows us to test whether the effects of the variables do not change across small, medium and large 
sized firms.      22
 
IV.1.2. Manufacturing Industry Firms   
In this section, we consider manufacturing firms and investigate whether the results 
are robust for the small, medium and large sized firms. Table 3 reports the results of the 
one-step system GMM estimations using all the available t-2 (and earlier) dynamic lags of 
the firm-specific variables. The instrument set contains also the current values of the 
maintained strictly exogenous variables CONF and RG. Equations (3.2), (3.3) and (3.4) 
reports the results for the subsamples of large, medium and small sized manufacturing 
industry firms, respectively. Equation (3.5) reports the results for the estimation of (2) for 
the whole sample. In (3.5) all the variables including the instrument set are interacted with 
Type1 and Type2, which define the dummy variables for the small and medium sized 
firms, respectively. The equations in Table 3 pass all the diagnostics except the Hansen-
Sargan J-test of overidentification restrictions. The combined equation estimated for the 
whole sample, which is indeed our main equation of interest, passes also the Hansen-
Sargan test supporting our choice of the instrument set.  
The results strongly suggest that the determinants of FAS significantly differ across 
large, medium and small sized manufacturing industry firms. Small sized firms adjust 
more rapidly than the medium and large sized firms as suggested by the lower FASit-1 
coefficient. Small sized firms may be expected to be more financially constrained leading 
them to face up with relatively higher cost of deviating from their desired FA holdings. 
The larger firms, on the other hand, have better access to credit markets allowing them to 
adjust more slowly without incurring a high level of agency cost. The significantly higher 
adjustment coefficient for the small firms, in this context, may be reflecting their situation 
that the cost of being out of equilibrium relative to the cost of adjustment is higher. 
Consistent with the argument that larger firms are more flexible in allocating their 
resources into real and financial investments, the impact of the profitability appears to be 
monotonically increasing with the firm size. The small sized firms are much more 
dependent on external finance and consequently they may be expected to have less desire 
to hold financial assets due to the precautionary motive. The behaviour of the small sized 
firms with their more rapid adjustment towards their target desired cash holdings and less 
desire to accumulate financial assets with an increase in their profits appears to be 
consistent with the postulations of the trade-off theory. In the context of the significance   23
of the PROF coefficient, it may be argued that the medium and large sized manufacturing 
firms behave in accordance with the pecking-order theory.  
The LR coefficient is significant only for the small sized manufacturing firms. The 
negative LR coefficient may reflect that the increase in the cost of liquidity with higher 
debt levels is the more dominant factor for the small sized firms. This result, however, 
should be interpreted with a caution since the differences in the LR coefficient estimates 
across the firm groups are not statistically significant. The cost of external finance 
decreases with asset tangibility and thus the transactions and precautionary demand for 
FA decreases with the collateral (COL). The figures presented by Table 1 suggested that 
the collateral ratios monotonically increase with the size of the manufacturing firms. The 
impact of the collateral on reducing the FAS, on the other hand, significantly increases 
with firm size. This is consistent with the view that tangible fixed assets of the larger 
firms worth more as a collateral and can mitigate contractibility problem better so that 
their marginal benefit in reducing the precautionary demand for liquidity is higher.  
The effect of macroeconomic uncertainty on precautionary FA holdings may be 
expected to be substantially higher for financially constrained firms (Baum et al., 2006). 
As Almeida et al. (2004) indicate, financially unconstrained firms have no reason to hold 
precautionary liquidity. Consistent with these arguments, the FA holdings of the small 
and medium sized manufacturing firms significantly increase with an increase in the 
macroeconomic uncertainty (a decrease in the macroeconomic confidence, CONF). The 
impact of uncertainty on the large sized firms appears to be insignificant. Regardless of 
their size classification, all firm types tend to increase their FAS significantly as the real 
rate of return on government bonds (RG) increases. The impact of RG on FAS is 
statistically the same for the small, medium and large sized manufacturing firms.    24
 
Table 3. The Determinants of Financial Asset Holdings: Manufacturing Industry Firms 
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W(7) = 545[0.00] 
P[H-S] = 0.00 
m1 = -18.8 [0.00] 
m2 = 0.00 [1.00] 
χ
2
W(6) = 242[0.00] 
P[H-S] = 0.97 
m1 = -8.38 [0.00] 
m2 = -1.30 [0.19] 
χ
2
W(6) = 161[0.00] 
P[H-S] = 0.01 
m1 = -10.7 [0.00] 
m2 = -0.24 [0.81] 
χ
2
W(6) = 212[0.00] 
P[H-S] = 0.08 
m1 = -12.6 [0.00] 
m2 = 1.60 [0.11] 
Χ
2
W(20) = 643 [0.00] 
P[H-S] = 0.11 
m1 = -18.3 [0.00] 
m2 = 0.21 [0.83] 
Notes: N is the effective number of firm-year observations. The values in parentheses are the coefficient standard errors  (d.f adjusted) that are robust to within cross-
section residual correlation and heteroscedasticity (Arellano, 1987).  *, ** and *** denote the significance at the 10, 5 and 1 %, respectively.   m1 and m2 are the  
Arellano and Bond (1991) tests for first-order and second-order serial correlation, asymptotically N(0,1). χ
2
W is the Wald test for the joint insignificance of the 
explanatory variables, with p-values given in [.]. P[H-S] reports the p–value of the Hansen-Sargan test for instrument validity and overidentification restrictions. In (3.5) 
the columns under Type1 and Type2 reports the coefficient estimates of the corresponding variables interacted with dummy variables defining small and medium sized 
manufacturing industry firms, respectively.  
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IV.1.3. Other Non-Financial Firms   
Table 4 reports the one-step robust system GMM results for the subsamples and the 
whole sample of the ONF firms estimated by using the same instrument selection 
procedure as in the earlier sections. The estimation results for the whole sample presented 
by (4.5) are data-acceptable as the equation passes all the diagnostics including the 
instrument set validity and the lack of serial correlation. When compared with those for 
the manufacturing firms, the persistence of FAS is relatively higher for the ONF firms. 
The adjustment coefficients tend to decrease with the firm size but the differences 
between them are not significant as reported by (4.5). Consistent with the results for the 
manufacturing industry firms, the impact of profitability is the highest for the large sized 
ONF firms. However, differing from the manufacturing firms, the PROF coefficient is 
significant (insignificant) for the small (medium) sized ONF firms. A similar finding is 
reported for the LR coefficient. The impact of the LR is significant only for the medium 
sized ONF firms. The positive coefficient may be implying that medium sized ONF firms 
tend to hold more precautionary FA as higher debt levels can increase the likelihood of a 
financial distress for them. The positive financial distress effect of the LR tends to be 
offset by negative debt risk premium and better ability to access to financial markets 
affects for the small and large sized ONF firms, respectively. The significant PROF 
coefficient for the small sized ONF firms, in this context, may be interpreted as they 
preferring internal finance due to the higher cost of risk premium on external finance 
accumulation for them.  
According to the figures presented by Table 1 earlier, the collateral ratios increase 
with the size of the ONF firms. The results by Table 4 suggest that higher asset tangibility 
(COL) leads to lower precautionary FA holdings and the impact is statistically the same 
for the small, medium and large sized firms. Contrasting with the evidence for the 
manufacturing firms, the marginal benefit of the collateral tends to decrease with the ONF 
firm size. An increase in the macroeconomic uncertainty (a decrease in the 
macroeconomic confidence CONF) causes ONF firms to hold more precautionary 
financial assets as expected. However, the evidence does not support the view that the 
impact of macroeconomic uncertainty decreases with the firm size. This may be either 
due to a case that all the ONF firms, regardless of their size, are equivalently financially 
constrained or the larger firms with more tangible fixed assets are more prudent in   26
response to a macroeconomic uncertainty. The response of FAS to government bond 
interest rates is significantly positive for medium and small sized firms. The positive but 
insignificant RG coefficient for the large sized ONF firms as these firms have the highest 
share of government securities in their total assets and obtaining the highest interest 
income constituting around a quarter per cent of their operating income (Table 1). Given 
the fact that government securities real interest rates have been substantially high during 
the period, the insignificance of the RG coefficient for the large firms may be explained 
by their financial adaptation. As government securities have yielded relatively less risky 
real returns whilst providing liquidity during the period, especially large sized ONF firms 
may well be allocating a certain proportion of their excess cash flows into FA including 
GS. To investigate the validity of such a financial adaptation argument, we clearly need to 
investigate also the determinants of the firms’ holdings of government securities during 
the period. This is indeed the task of the following section in which we undertake for the 
samples of both manufacturing industry and other non-financial firms.   
 
IV.2. The Determinants of the Government Securities Holdings  
Non-financial firms hold FA including government securities to hedge themselves 
against liquidity and interest rate risks and maturity mismatches. Government securities 
(GS), especially those with short maturities, provide liquidity services and can be used as 
financial collateral. In this context, the firms’ holdings of short-term government debt 
instruments can plausibly be explained by the transactions-cum-precautionary motives of 
the conventional literature. However, under macroeconomic instability with substantially 
high budget deficits and thus high uncertainty leading to excessively high real interest 
rates for GS, non-financial firms may prefer to defer real investments and hold GS also 
for their speculative motive. In this context, government domestic debt finance can 
alleviate or relax the firms’ financial constraints by draining the available resources in the 
economy or by providing liquidity services, respectively. This section investigates the 
determinants of the firms’ holdings of GS under such macroeconomic conditions. The 
consequences of the government debt finance and the non-financial firms’ GS holdings 
for their investment decisions are investigated in the following section. 
.  27
Table 4. The Determinants of Financial Asset Holdings: Other Non-financial Firms 
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W(7) = 523.00] 
P[H-S] = 0.01 
m1 = -16.6 [0.00] 




P[H-S] = 0.99 
m1 = -5.84 [0.00] 




P[H-S] = 0.02 
m1 = -8.66 [0.00] 
m = 2.70 [0.01] 
χ
2
W(6) = 222[0.00] 
P[H-S] = 0.04 
m1 = -13.1 [0.00] 
m2 = -0.40 [0.69] 
χ
2
W(21) = 430 [0.00] 
P[H-S] = 0.17 
m1 = -16.7 [0.00] 
m2 = -1.37 [0.21] 
Notes: N is the effective number of firm-year observations. The values in parentheses are the coefficient standard errors  (d.f adjusted) that are robust to within cross-
section residual correlation and heteroscedasticity (Arellano, 1987).  *, ** and *** denote the significance at the 10, 5 and 1 %, respectively.   m1 and m2 are the  
Arellano and Bond (1991) tests for first-order and second-order serial correlation, asymptotically N(0,1). χ
2
W is the Wald test for the joint insignificance of the 
explanatory variables, with p-values given in [.]. P[H-S] reports the p–value of the Hansen-Sargan test for instrument validity and overidentification restrictions. In (3.5) 
the columns under Type1 and Type2 reports the coefficient estimates of the corresponding variables interacted with dummy variables defining small and medium sized 
ONF firms, respectively.   28
The empirical literature often does not explicitly take into account the role of 
government debt instruments in the firms’ FA portfolios. We maintain that the sets of the 
firm specific (F) and macroeconomic condition variables defined for the determinants of 
the FA holdings may be postulated also for explaining the non-financial firms holdings of 
government securities. Therefore, we consider the following general forms:  
GSSit =  α1GSSit-1 + βFit  + γMt  + ui + υt + ηit      ( 3 )  
GSSit =  α1GSSit-1 + βFit  + γMt  + α1j(TYPEj*FAit-1) + βj(TYPEj*Fit)   
+  γj(TYPEj* Mt)  + ui + υt + ηit       ( 4 )  
where GSS is the share of government securities in total assets. The sets of the firm-
specific (F) and macroeconomic condition variables (M) are maintained to be the same as 
the FA holdings and TYPEj is a dummy variable defining the firm size category as in the 
earlier sections.   
 Table 5 reports the robust one-step system GMM estimation results for the samples of 
manufacturing industry and ONF firms using all the available t-2 (and earlier) dynamic 
lags of GSSit, PROFit, LRit, COLit,, and SIZEit as instruments. The instrument set contains 
also the current values of the maintained strictly exogenous variables CONF and RG. In 
(4.5) all the variables including the instrument set are interacted with the size dummies 
Type1 and Type2, which define the dummy variables for the small and medium sized 
firms, respectively. The equations in Table 5 pass all the diagnostics except the Hansen-
Sargan test. The results for the whole sample suggest that, consistent with their FA 
holding behaviour, the non-financial firms’ holdings of GS increase with their 
profitability and size and decreases with their asset tangibility. The LR is significantly 
positive implying that the ability of firms with higher debt to access financial markets 
more than offsets the negative impacts of higher debt. Supporting the presence of a 
financial adaptation, the GSS exhibit some persistence as suggested by the significant 
GSSit-1 coefficient in (5.1). The persistence, however, is not large and non-financial firms 
can be viewed to adjust relatively rapidly to a deviation from their desired GS holdings. 
Non-financial firms increase their GSS with an increase in the macroeconomic 
uncertainty and real interest rates on government securities. All these findings are broadly 
consistent with those for the FA holdings of the firms discussed in Section IV.1.1. This 
may not be surprising as FAS and GSS followed a similar path during the period as 
shown by Figure 1 earlier.   29
Table 5. The Determinants of the Government Securities Holdings: All Firms 
 
































































tMAN = 2.20** 
N  51857 25350 26507 




W(7) = 570 [0.00] 
P[H-S] = 0.00 
m1 = -14.2 [0.00] 
m2 = 0.32 [0.75] 
χ
2
W(7) = 345.00] 
P[H-S] = 0.00 
m1 = -11.6 [0.00] 
m2 = 0.89 [0.38] 
χ
2
W(7) = 258 [0.00] 
P[H-S] = 0.01 
m1 = -8.69 [0.00] 
m2 = -0.51 [0.61] 
Notes: N is the effective number of firm-year observations. The values in parentheses are the 
coefficient standard errors  (d.f adjusted) that are robust to within cross-section residual correlation 
and heteroscedasticity (Arellano, 1987).  *, **  and *** denote the significance at the 10, 5 and 1 %, 
respectively.   m1 and m2 are the  Arellano and Bond (1991) tests for first-order and second-order 
serial correlation, asymptotically N(0,1). χ
2
W is the Wald test for the joint insignificance of the 
explanatory variables, with p-values given in [.]. P[H-S] reports the p–value of the Hansen-Sargan test 
for instrument validity and overidentification restrictions. tMAN is the t-ratio to test the hypothesis that 
the coefficient of the corresponding variable is the same for manufacturing industry and ONF firms.  
As for the FAS, the determinants of the GSS of the manufacturing industry and 
ONF firms differ from each other to a certain extend. The persistence of the GSS tends to 
be significantly higher for the ONF firms reflecting a plausible situation that 
manufacturing firms are able to adjust more rapidly to disequilibrium. The non-financial 
firms’ GSS increase with their profitability and size and the magnitude of these affects 
appears not to be statistically different between manufacturing and ONF firms. The   30
impacts of the debt related variables LR and COL are significant only for manufacturing  
firms. Higher asset tangibility is thus effective for these firms in reducing a need to hold 
GS as a liquid collateral. In the same vein, the manufacturing firms with higher debt 
levels appear to be able to hold more GS potentially reflecting their better access to credit 
markets. This may be consistent also with a situation that manufacturing firms with lower 
debt risk premiums and better access to financial markets may prefer to borrow from 
international markets in the case of favourable conditions and invest in high yielding 
domestic GS. An increase in macroeconomic uncertainty and government bond real 
interest rates appear to be effective in increasing their GS holdings only for the ONF 
firms. Although the behaviour may change with respect to the firm size as will be 
discussed later, this preliminary evidence may suggest that the speculative motive is 
stronger for the ONF firms. This is consistent also with the observation that the GSS of 
the ONF firms are significantly larger than those of the manufacturing firms as already 
presented by Table 1.  
Table 6 reports the system GMM results for the subsamples and the whole sample of 
the manufacturing industry firms. As for the FAS, the GS holdings of the firms exhibits 
some inertia reflecting financial adaptation whilst small sized firms adjust to their desired 
holdings more rapidly than the others. In response to an increase in their profits, large and 
small sized firms tend to accumulate more government securities compared to the 
medium sized firms. This may reflect that small sized firms are more prudent against 
interest rate and credit risks and the large sized firms are less financially constrained so 
that they are more able to make speculative motive-led financial investments. The LR 
coefficient is significant only for the small sized firms potentially due to their higher need 
to use GS to hedge against interest rate and credit shocks. However, the differences 
between the LR coefficients across the small, medium and large sized firms are not 
statistically significant. Firms with higher asset tangibility may be expected to hold less 
GS to be used as collateral. As the asset tangibility increases with the manufacturing 
industry firm size (Table 1), the significant decrease in the impact of COL with the firm 
size may thus be interpreted as perfectly in line with this expectation.  
The precautionary demand for FA increases with macroeconomic uncertainty. This 
may not be the case for speculative demand, as a decrease in macroeconomic confidence 
may also mean an increased uncertainty on the expected real returns on FA. The 
significant increase in the large sized firms’ GSS with an increase in CONF, and thus with 
a decrease in the perceived macroeconomic uncertainty lends a strong support to the   31
speculative motive argument. The part of GS held due to the precautionary motive may be 
expected to be relatively larger for small and medium sized firms, and consequently the 
impact of uncertainty may be indeterminate for them. The statistical insignificance of the 
CONF coefficient for the small and medium sized firms may thus be reflecting such a 
portfolio choice. An increase in the real rate of return on GS leads to a significant increase 
in the GSS of all the manufacturing firm groups. This impact tends to be higher for small 
sized firms than the others.  
Table 7 reports the estimation results for the ONF firms. The determinants of GSS 
of the ONF firms are broadly in line with their FAS as reported by Table 4. There is some 
degree of persistence in their GSS but the adjustment is relatively rapid whilst the speed 
of adjustment does not vary significantly among small, medium and large sized ONF 
firms. The firms increase their GSS with their profitability and the profitability impact 
monotonically increases with the firm size. The large sized (and to a certain extent 
medium sized) ONF firms with higher debt tend to hold more GS plausible due to their 
better access to international financial markets allowing them to borrow in order to buy 
high yielding government securities when the conditions are perceived to be favourable. 
Contrasting to the case for the manufacturing firms, the asset tangibility increase 
with the size of the ONF firms (Table 1). The asset tangibility variable (COL), however, 
is significant only for the medium sized ONF firms. The negative COL coefficient is 
consistent with a behaviour that the firms’ need for GS as a liquid collateral decreases 
with their asset tangibility. The insignificance of COL for the large and small sized ONF 
firms, on the other hand, may reasonably be explained by their holdings of GS 
predominantly for speculative and/or hedging motives. An increase in the macroeconomic 
uncertainty leads medium sized ONF firms to increase their GS portfolios. When 
interpreted in conjunction also to the COL coefficient estimate, the precautionary motive 
tends to be dominating in their GSS. For the large and small sized ONF firms, on the 
other hand, the positive precautionary demand affect in the presence of higher uncertainty 
is offset by the negative speculative demand affect leading to an insignificant CONF 
coefficient. As for the FAS, the response of the GSS to the real government bond interest 
rates is significantly positive for medium and small sized firms. The insignificance of the 
RG variable for the FAS of the large sized ONF firms appears to be the case also for their 
GSS. The persistently high real rates of returns on government debt instruments seems to 
lead the large sized ONF firms to financially adapt by allocating a certain proportion of 
their excess cash flow into GS.    32
Table 6. The Determinants of the Government Securities Holdings: Manufacturing Industry Firms 
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W(7) = 345.00] 
P[H-S] = 0.00 
m1 = -11.6 [.00] 
m2 = 0.89 [0.38] 
χ
2
W(6) = 142[0.00] 
P[H-S] = 0.98 
m1 = -6.83 [0.00] 
m2 = -0.34 [0.73] 
χ
2
W(6) = 70[0.00] 
P[H-S] = 0.00 
m1 = -6.97 [0.00] 
m2 =  1.60 [0.11] 
χ
2
W(6) = 115[0.00] 
P[H-S] = 0.00 
m1 = -6.62 [0.00] 
m2 = 0.30 [0.77] 
χ
2
W(20) = 505 [0.00] 
P[H-S] = 0.00 
m1 = -11.6 [0.00] 
m2 = -1.08 [0.28] 
Notes: N is the effective number of firm-year observations. The values in parentheses are the coefficient standard errors  (d.f adjusted) that are robust to within cross-
section residual correlation and heteroscedasticity (Arellano, 1987).  *, ** and *** denote the significance at the 10, 5 and 1 %, respectively.   m1 and m2 are the  
Arellano and Bond (1991) tests for first-order and second-order serial correlation, asymptotically N(0,1). χ
2
W is the Wald test for the joint insignificance of the 
explanatory variables, with p-values given in [.]. P[H-S] reports the p–value of the Hansen-Sargan test for instrument validity and overidentification restrictions. In (3.5) 
the columns under Type1 and Type2 reports the coefficient estimates of the corresponding variables interacted with dummy variables defining small and medium sized 
manufacturing industry firms, respectively.  
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Table 7. The Determinants of the Government Securities Holdings: Other Non-financial Firms 











(7.4) Small      Type = Small   
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W(7) = 258 [0.00
P[H-S] = 0.01 
m1 = -8.69 [0.00] 
m2 = -0.51 [0.61] 
χ
2
W(6) = 68 [0.00] 
P[H-S] = 0.99 
m1 = -4.81 [0.00] 
m2 = -0.21 [0.84] 
χ
2
W(6) = 78[0.00] 
P[H-S] = 0.00 
m1 = -5.27[0.00] 
m2 = 0.17 [0.87] 
χ
2
W(6) = 100[0.00] 
P[H-S] = 0.11 
m1 = -5.40 [0.00] 
m2 = -1.33 [0.18] 
χ
2
W(20) = 409 [0.00] 
P[H-S] = 0.00 
m1 = -8.84 [0.00] 
m2 = -0.59 [0.55] 
Notes: N is the effective number of firm-year observations. The values in parentheses are the coefficient standard errors  (d.f. adjusted) that are robust to within cross-
section residual correlation and heteroscedasticity (Arellano, 1987).  *, ** and *** denote the significance at the 10, 5 and 1 %, respectively.   m1 and m2 are the  
Arellano and Bond (1991) tests for first-order and second-order serial correlation, asymptotically N(0,1). χ
2
W is the Wald test for the joint insignificance of the 
explanatory variables, with p-values given in [.]. P[H-S] reports the p–value of the Hansen-Sargan test for instrument validity and overidentification restrictions. In (3.5) 
the columns under Type1 and Type2 reports the coefficient estimates of the corresponding variables interacted with dummy variables defining small and medium sized 
manufacturing industry firms, respectively.    34
V. Financial Crowding-Out and the Consequences of the Firms’ FA Holdings  
The conventional wisdom assuming perfect frictionless markets suggests that firms’ 
real decisions including investments are invariant to both their balance sheet structures 
and macroeconomic conditions in the economy (Modigliani and Miller, 1958). The credit 
channel literature, on the other hand, considers capital market imperfections and provides 
two complementary ways that the firms’ financial positions can affect real economic 
activity (Bernanke et al., 1999 and Gertler et al., 2003). The bank lending channel focuses 
on the asset side of the bank's balance sheets and discusses the impact of changes in credit 
conditions on the investment/spending decisions of borrowers (firms). Under the balance 
sheet channel, on the other hand, it is the balance sheet of borrowers, rather than lenders, 
which matters for finance costs and thus real outcomes.  
Contrasting with the predictions of the Modigliani-Miller framework with perfect 
capital markets, the results presented so far strongly suggest that the liquid financial asset 
holdings of the corporate sector can be explained both by transactions-cum-precautionary 
and speculative motives along with the macroeconomic condition variables in Turkey. 
Consistent with the presence of a balance sheet channel, the firms’ real investments, in 
this context, may not be invariant to their financial positions. The strong speculative 
motive for the holdings of financial assets (FA) and government securities (GS), on the 
other hand, may be interpreted as lending a preliminary support for an argument that the 
firms’ financial investments crowd-out their real investments. In Turkey, the financial 
system is predominantly bank-based and the banks tend to finance public sector deficits 
with their rather limited sources (Aydın et al., 2006). An increase in the public sector 
borrowing requirement, in this context, can change the credit composition of the asset side 
of the bank's balance sheets by draining the sources available to the corporate sector. In 
such a case, the real investments of firms may be determined also by the changes in the 
credit conditions as suggested by the bank lending channel of the balance sheet literature.  
To the best of our knowledge, there is no empirical study using firm level data 
investigating the consequences of government debt finance on real investments
19. This 
                                                 
19 IMF (2006) provides a notable exception in considering public sector deficits as a relevant variable to 
explain firms’ demand for liquid financial assets.  IMF (2006, p. 155) notes that “the general government 
balance-to-GDP ratio was introduced, as it may affect availability of external financing and also to capture 
the possible offset between corporate and government saving”.  Such a reasoning might be the case also for 
the corporate investments and government dissaving as discussed by a large body of macroeconomic 
literature but frequently ignored in microeconometric models of investment.  
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may be viewed as reasonable for a market-based system or a bank-based system with 
government debt instruments constituting only a negligible part of the commercial banks’ 
assets as have been the case for most of the advanced industrial countries. The theory, 
however, may not strongly justify such reasoning as government debt finance may have 
real affects under a non-Ricardian world even if it is not held mainly by commercial 
banks. Government domestic debt finance can alleviate or relax the firms’ financial 
constraints by draining the available resources in the economy or by providing liquidity 
services, respectively. Government debt instruments, especially those with short 
maturities, provide liquidity services and can be used as financial collateral. As Woodford 
(1990) and Holmstorm and Tirole (1998) argue, government debt as net wealth may thus 
crowd-in private investment by relaxing liquidity constraint in non-Ricardian economies 
with imperfect capital markets. However, these affects of the government debt may not be 
invariant to the financial development, the mode and the level of public debt finance. 
Substantially high levels of government borrowing from domestic markets not only can 
drain limited sources for investment but also can lead to an upward pressure on interest 
rates except possibly in a perfect Ricardian world. The financial crowding out affect 
might be expected more severe for bank dependent firms when the public debt is financed 
through the commercial banking system. The lack of an adequate financial depth can 
amplify the crowding out problem as substantially large shares of public debt in the 
domestic financial system can decrease the overall liquidity with increasing the country 
risk premium and thus reducing capital inflows (Caballero and Krishnamurthy, 2004). 
Under these conditions, fiscal contractions can be expansionary as they alleviate the credit 
constraint of firms.  
We consider the following accelerator model of investment
20 augmented with PSBR 
(public sector borrowing requirement as a per cent of GDP):  
INVit =  α1INVit-1 + β1Sit +  β2CFit  + β3FASit  + β4PSBRt  + ui + υt + ηit   (5) 
where INV is the real investment rate measured as the annual change in real tangible fixed 
assets (RTA), S is the ratio of real net sales to the beginning of the period RTA (RTAt-1), 
CF is real cash flow measured as earnings before extraordinary items and depreciation 
over RTAt-1 and FAS is the ratio of financial assets to total assets as defined earlier. All 
the real variables are obtained by using the CPI deflator. To test whether the coefficient 
                                                 
20 See Schiantarelli (1996), Hubbard (1998), Mairesse, Hall and Mulkay (1999) Bond and Reenen (2006) 
and the references therein for the recent surveys of the investment models.    36
estimates do not vary across different firm groups, we also augment equation (5) with all 
the explanatory variables interacted with dummy variables defining the small and medium 
sized firms. The equation contains also the lagged dependent variable INVit-1 to take into 
account the potential quadratic and persistent adjustment costs. Gilchrist and Himmelberg 
(1998) shows that the sales growth variable S proxies the marginal profitability of capital 
(MPK) given that the underlying production function is Cobb-Douglas. The coefficient of 
S can also be interpreted as reflecting the accelerator effect since an increase in sales 
signals more demand for the firm’s output leading to an increase in investment. The cash 
flow variable (CF), on the other hand, represents basically the financial condition of the 
firm
21 and may contain also information on future investment opportunities along with the 
MPK (Gilchrist and Himmelberg, 1998; Bond et al., 2003). In the absence of a 
speculative-led motive leading real and financial investments to be substitutes, the amount 
of FA holdings may be interpreted as “financial slack” (Myers and Majluf, 1984). Under 
capital market imperfections, the precautionary FA holdings allow firms to undertake 
profitable projects which would not be the case otherwise and therefore may be expected 
to have a positive coefficient in an investment equation.  
Our data set contains no information whether the firms are listed in the stock exchange 
therefore we are unable to compute a Tobin’s Q proxy such as the market value of assets 
relative to the book value. However, under certain conditions, the accelerator and the Q-
theoretic models may be related to each other as neatly shown by Gilchrist and 
Himmelberg (1998). In the context of the Tobin’s Q framework under financial frictions, 
Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1998) shows that investment can be specified as a function of 
the expected present values of the MPK and financial state variables of the firm including 
cash flow and liquid financial assets representing “fundamental Q” and “financial Q”, 
respectively. Under perfect capital markets with no financial frictions, the share prices 
correctly reflect fundamentals and thus expectations on MPK are given by the firm’s 
stock market valuation. In such a case, the fundamental Q is equivalent to the 
conventional Tobin’s Q. However, under capital market imperfections, the use of Tobin’s 
                                                 
21 As noted by Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1998), the cash flow (CF) variable provides additional sources 
of independent variation from the sales (S) variable as it treats taxes payable and interest payments as fixed 
costs and contains also internal funds generated from financial investments and other non-operating assets. 
The simple correlation coefficients between CF and S for our samples of all, large, medium and small sized 
manufacturing industry firms are respectively computed as 0.08(0.00), 0.04 (0.00), 0.12(0.00) and –0.32 
(0.00), with the values in parentheses are the p-values. This supports that CF provides additional information 
which is distinct from S.    37
Q may be misleading
22 as it may contain also changes in the expected financial status of 
the firm (Gilchrist and Himmelberg, 1998). Gilchrist and Sim (2006) note that, if Sit and 
CFit follow a first-order autoregressive process, then their expected present values and 
current values are proportional supporting their use in (5). Similarly, in the context of the 
conventional Euler based accelerator model, the current values of S and CF can be shown 
to describe the changes about the expected values of MPK and financial conditions, 
respectively
23 (Mairesse, Hall and Mulkay, 1999). In such a case, the Q-theoretic model 
by Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1998) may be observationally equivalent to the accelerator 
model.  
In the Modigliani and Miller world of perfect capital markets, only the MPK (sales 
growth) or the fundamental Q should be significant. The significance of any of the rest of 
the variables may thus be interpreted as reflecting some capital market imperfections 
including the presence of financial constraints. This is indeed the basic starting point of 
the studies beginning with Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988) attempting to investigate 
the presence of financial constraints. According to Fazzari et al. (1988, 2000) a positive 
and significant cash flow (CF) coefficient in a Tobin’s Q model of investment suggests 
that firms are financially constrained as they primarily rely on internal funds for financing 
investment. The costs of internal and external finance tend to diverge due to asymmetric 
information, monitoring costs and incentive problems. The investment-cash flow 
sensitivity might be expected to increase monotonically with the cost premium of external 
finance for the financially constrained firms (Bond and Söderbom, 2006). The wedge 
between external and internal finance tends to be higher for smaller firms under capital 
market imperfections leading them to internal finance as suggested by the pecking-order 
theory. Consistent with this view, Fazzari et al. (1988, 2000) find that the sensitivity of 
investment to cash flow and thus the degree of financial constraints monotonically 
decreases with the firm size. As surveyed by Schiantarelli (1996) and Hubbard (1998), a 
number of empirical studies following Fazzari et al. (1988) supported this postulation 
after classifying firms according to some characteristics maintained to reflect the level of 
financial constraints that they may be subject to.  
                                                 
22There are many other reasons for the misspecification of the Q model including the presence of 
adjustment and agency costs, market inefficiencies and rational bubbles as suggested by Hubbard (1998), 
Mairesse, Hall and Mulkay (1999), Bond and Reenen (2003) and elsewhere.  
23 Note that, in the context of Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1998), the current values of S and CF represents 
the expected present values of MPK and financial conditions under an assumption that S and CF follow a 
first-order autoregressive process ( Gilchrist and Sim, ).    38
The recent literature following Kaplan and Zingales (1997, 2000), however, suggest 
that there is no consensus on the issue that whether the sensitivity of investment to cash 
flow reflects the degree of financial constraints. According to Kaplan and Zingales (1997, 
2000) financially constrained firms indeed have the lowest sensitivity of investment to 
cash flow. Similar findings are reported by subsequent studies including Cleary (1999, 
2006). Bond et al. (2003) finds that the firms in market-based systems have higher cash 
flow sensitivities than those in the bank-based systems. According to Mizen and 
Vermeulen (2005) it is not the size but the creditworthiness industry-by-industry that 
determines the availability of external finance and the cash flow sensitivity. Leaven 
(2003) and Love (2003) find that financial development reduces the effect of financing 
constraints on investment in particular for smaller firms. The articles in Galindo and 
Schiantarelli (2003) based on the application of the Fazzari et al. (1988, 2000) 
methodology to firm level data for several Latin American countries provide mixed 
results for the relationship between firm size and the cash flow sensitivity.   
Under capital market imperfections, the distinction between the financial Q and 
fundamental Q may not be clear and the financial Q represented by cash flow may convey 
information also on expected profitability and future investment opportunities that are not 
fully accounted for by the fundamental Q and thus MPK (Bond and Reenen, 2006 and 
Gilchrist and Sim, 2006). Furthermore, even in the absence of capital market 
imperfections, financial variables may be relevant for investment to the extend that they 
contain information about the expected marginal value of capital (Gilchrist and Sim, 
2006). The seperability between real and financial decisions does not hold if the firm 
faces imperfect capital markets as argued by Bond and Reenen (2006). In the same vein, 
Hubbard (1998, p. 206) states that “it is important to consider investment and financial 
policy jointly; firms may, for example, accumulate liquidity as a buffer against future 
constraints”. These arguments, albeit maintaining that the firms’ financial decisions are 
motivated by transactions and precautionary demands, may perfectly be consistent for 
profit maximizing firms investing in financial assets due to a speculative motive in the 
face of favourable expected relative real returns. In such an important but somewhat 
neglected case by the literature, financial investments of non-financial firms crowd out 
their real investments. A negative FAS coefficient in the investment equation may thus be 
interpreted as firms see financial investments as a substitute to their real investments 
rather than a complement.     39
Table 8 reports the robust one-step system GMM estimation results for the samples of 
large, medium and small sized manufacturing industry firms using all the available t-2 
(and earlier) dynamic lags of INVit, FASit, CFit, and Sit as instruments. The instrument set 
contains also the current values of the maintained strictly exogenous variable PSBR. The 
table reports also the GMM results for the whole sample from the estimation of equation 
(5) augmented with all the variables interacted with the type dummies defining small and 
medium sized firms. The equation for the whole sample (8.4) can be interpreted as data-
acceptable as it passes all the diagnostics. A similar case applies to the subsample 
estimates except the Hansen-Sargan test for the medium and to a certain extent small 
sized firms. The lagged dependent variable INVit-1 is insignificant
24 in all the equations at 
the 5% level suggesting that deviations from the target real investment growth is 
somewhat transitory.  
The sales variable (S) representing the marginal product of capital (MPK, or the 
fundamental Q) is positive and strongly significant in all the equations. The investment 
accelerator impact of the sales is significantly lower for the medium sized firms than the 
others. For the medium sized firms, only the sales variable appears to be significant in 
explaining investment suggesting that they are the least financially constrained. However, 
such an interpretation may be misleading as it ignores the fact that the medium sized firms 
hold substantial amounts of precautionary and speculative financial assets which is not 
consistent with the absence of financial market imperfections. As indicated by Almeida et 
al. (2004) and elsewhere, financially unconstrained firms have no reason to hold 
precautionary liquid financial assets. In the absence of a speculative motive, the FA 
variable should enter with a significantly positive coefficient to the investment equation. 
If the financial assets are hold purely due to a speculative motive, then the FA coefficient 
should be significantly negative suggesting financial investments crowding out real 
investments. The insignificance of the FA variable, in this context, may be interpreted as 
reflecting the impact of the speculative motive is almost offsetting that of the transactions-
cum-precautionary motive for the medium sized firms under financial imperfections. A 
similar case may be applicable also for the insignificance of the FA for the small sized 
manufacturing firms. 
                                                 
24 The empirical results remained virtually the same when we excluded the insignificant lagged dependent 
variable from the equations.    40
Table 8. The Determinants of Investment: Manufacturing Industry Firms 
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W(5) = 629[0.00] 
P[H-S] = 0.98 
m1 = -3.51 [0.00] 
m2 = 0.58[0.56] 
χ
2
W(5) = 761[0.00] 
P[H-S] = 0.01 
m1 = -1.80 [0.00] 




P[H-S] = 0.06 
m1 = -8.07 [0.00] 
m2 = -0.14 [0.11] 
χ
2
W(17) = 1524 [0.00] 
P[H-S] = 0.18 
m1 = -1.47 [0.14] 
m2 = -0.51 [0.61] 
Notes: N is the effective number of firm-year observations. The values in parentheses are the coefficient standard errors  (d.f adjusted) that are 
robust to within cross-section residual correlation and heteroscedasticity (Arellano, 1987).  *, ** and *** denote the significance at the 10, 5 and 1 
%, respectively. m1 and m2 are the  Arellano and Bond (1991) tests for first-order and second-order serial correlation, asymptotically N(0,1). χ
2
W is 
the Wald test for the joint insignificance of the explanatory variables, with p-values given in [.]. P[H-S] reports the p–value of the Hansen-Sargan 
test for instrument validity and overidentification restrictions. In (8.4) the columns under Type1 and Type2 reports the coefficient estimates of the 
corresponding variables interacted with dummy variables defining small and medium sized manufacturing industry firms, respectively.    41
The cash flow (CF) is significant for the large and small sized manufacturing firms. 
Contrasting with the evidence by Fazzari et al. (1988, 2000), the CF sensitivity of 
investment is significantly higher for the large sized firms. However, this result is 
consistent with Kaplan and Zingales (1997, 2000) argument that financially constrained 
firms indeed have the lowest sensitivity of investment to cash flow. As already discussed, 
the distinction between the financial Q (cash flow) and fundamental Q (sales growth, 
MPK) may not be clear and the former may convey information also on expected 
profitability and future investment opportunities that are not fully accounted by the latter. 
The results by Table 1 suggested that profitability is highest for the large sized and lowest 
for the medium sized manufacturing firms. The CF sensitivity of investment tends to 
follow a similar pattern supporting that it reflects profitability and investment 
opportunities rather than the degree of the financial constraints.   
An increase in the FAS leads to a significant decrease in the large sized manufacturing 
firms’ investments. The speculative-led motive of the large sized firms with more 
financial flexibility and less financial constraints tend to more than offset their 
transactions-cum-precautionary demand for liquidity. The large sized manufacturing firms 
thus view financial investments as a substitute to their real investments rather than a 
complement. The evidence suggesting that financial investments tend to crowd out real 
investments is further supported by the significantly negative coefficient of the PSBR for 
the large sized manufacturing firms. In the Turkish bank-based system, the share of bank 
credits tends to increase with the firm size as reported by Yalçin et al. (2005) and Aydin 
et al. (2006). Consistent with the credit channel literature, the draining of the commercial 
bank resources available to private sector investments with the increase in the PSBR 
appears to be effective in reducing investments of the firms which are more bank-
dependent. As the medium and small sized manufacturing industry firms are more 
dependent on informal credit relations such as trade credits (Yalçin et al., 2005 and Aydin 
et al., 2006) than bank credits, the negative impact of the changing conditions of the 
banks’ balance sheets with an increase in the PSBR appears to be much less constraining 
in their real investments. For the large sized firms, we observe a direct an indirect impact 
of the PSBR. The direct impact is via their speculative motive for FA including GS in the 
face of substantially higher real returns under macroeconomic uncertainty. This financial 
crowding out of real investments by financial investments tends to be deepened by the 
behaviour of the commercial banks as their financial resources to finance real investments   42
decline with an increase in the PSBR. The contractionary effect of the higher budget 
deficits is consistent with the “expansionary fiscal contractions” arguments in the 
literature (Giavazzi et al., 2000 and Özatay, 2005). 
 
VI. Concluding Remarks 
When there is no financial market imperfections, non-financial firms do not need to 
hold liquid FA as financial buffers as they can raise funds instantaneously to finance their 
profitable projects. The conventional literature suggests the presence of capital market 
imperfections including the informational constraints and asymmetries, credit rationing 
and moral hazard to explain the firms’ uncertainty induced precautionary demand for 
liquidity. During the last decades, the deepening of international financial integration 
might be expected to relax the financial constraints that the firms may face and thus 
potentially reduce their demand for liquidity. Contrary with the predictions of the 
conventional capital market literature, the firms’ holdings of liquid FA tend to increase 
especially after the late 1990s in many countries. According to IMF (2006), the recent 
acceleration of financial asset holdings of non-financial firms in the G-7 countries is one 
of the striking changes in the global financial landscape. IMF (2006, p.136) further 
observes that  “since the 1980s, the corporate sector of the G-7 economies has swung 
from being a large net borrower of funds from other sectors of the economy to a net 
lender of funds”. This tendency of non-financial firms behaving as financial 
intermediaries clearly needs further explanation beyond which the pecking-order and 
trade-of theories of the conventional capital structure literature already provided. An 
alternative but not mutually exclusive view may be treating non-financial firms as facing 
a choice between allocating their resources into real and financial investments (Vickers, 
1987 and Holmstorm and Tirole, 2000). In such a case, as strongly supported by the 
results of this paper, financial investments may be a substitute or complementary to real 
investments depending respectively on whether the speculative or transactions-cum-
precautionary motive dominates.    
The share of liquid financial assets in the total assets of the non-financial firms in 
Turkey appears to be relatively high when compared internationally. At a glance, this may 
be quite surprising for the Turkish economy which suffered from substantially high 
inflation rates sustained during the most of the period until very recently, macroeconomic 
instability and two financial crises in the last two decades. According to this paper, the   43
fact that the FA holdings the Turkish firms is roughly comparable with those for the 
countries enjoying much lower inflation and stronger macroeconomic policy stance can 
indeed be explained by the salient features of the Turkish financial system. The Turkish 
financial system adapted to high inflation and macroeconomic instability by providing 
domestic currency denominated financial contracts including government domestic debt 
instruments and time deposits with extremely short maturities and foreign exchange 
deposits leading to a very high level of dollarisation. This financial adaptation allowed the 
corporate sector to hold interest bearing financial assets also for their liquidity services 
whilst hedging them against inflation and currency risks.  
The empirical results of this paper suggest that the FA and GS holdings of the Turkish 
corporate sector can be explained by firm specific factors including profitability, leverage 
ratio, asset tangibility and size along with macroeconomic condition variables such as real 
interest rates on government securities and macroeconomic uncertainty. The relative 
impacts of these variables significantly vary not only across manufacturing industry and 
other non-financial  (ONF) firms but also between the large, medium and small sized 
firms. The FA and GS holdings tend to increase with firm size and profitability. This 
contrasts with the transactions-cum-precautionary motive based “economies of scale” 
argument of the trade-off theory but consistent with the pecking-order theory postulation 
which takes into account also the impact of profitability for the firms preferring internal 
finance over external finance. The holdings of FA and GS for both manufacturing 
industry and ONF firms appear to be relatively persistent reflecting their financial 
adaptation. The persistence, however, is not substantially high and the adjustments 
towards the desired FA and GS holdings are not sluggish supporting the presence of the 
higher cost of being out of equilibrium relative to the cost of adjustment. The adjustment 
tend to be more rapid for the small firms which is reasonable as the cost of disequilibrium 
might decrease with the firm size and their better access to financial markets allows larger 
firms to adjust more slowly without incurring a high level of agency cost. 
The precautionary demand for FA increases with macroeconomic uncertainty and 
financial constraints. Supporting this argument, the FA holdings of the firms, except the 
large sized manufacturing industry firms as they are less financially constrained, 
significantly increase with macroeconomic uncertainty (a decrease in the macroeconomic 
confidence). This result provides a further support to the importance of macroeconomic 
stability in stimulating the efficient allocation of resources. The response of the demand   44
for FA to macroeconomic uncertainty may be helpful also in assessing whether they are 
held predominantly for transactions-cum-precautionary or speculative purposes. An 
increase in the macroeconomic instability may mean an increased uncertainty also on the 
expected real returns on FA causing the speculative demand for them to decline. The 
significant increase in the large sized manufacturing firms’ GS holdings with 
macroeconomic confidence lends a strong support to this argument. The part of the 
precautionary GS holdings may be expected to be relatively larger for small and medium 
sized firms, and consequently the impact of uncertainty may be indeterminate for them. 
The results from the GS equations indicate that the positive precautionary demand affect 
of higher uncertainty is offset by the negative speculative demand affect for the firm 
groups other than those classified as large manufacturing and medium ONF.  The 
empirical literature often ignores the role of own rate of return on financial assets 
implicitly maintaining that there is no speculative demand. The results of this paper, 
however, indicate that the own rate of return, represented by GS real interest rates (RG), 
is an important determinant of both FA and GS holdings. The presence of the speculative 
demand provides a further explanation for the finding that the demand for FA and GS 
increase with the firm size. The larger firms with less severe financing constraints due to 
their better access to financial markets are more able to allocate their resources into real 
and financial investments and thus hold more speculative motive-led FA and GS. Such a 
behaviour, however, crowds out their real investments. This speculative motive is rather 
limited for the smaller firms as they are relatively less flexible for holding FA for interest 
income apart from their liquidity under their heavier financial constraints. 
Given the fact that bond issuance has virtually no role in corporate finance in Turkey, 
the Turkish financial system can be characterised as a “bank-based” rather than “market-
based”. The level financial deepening in Turkey, however, is rather low even when 
compared to those of the countries with similar development levels, and banks tend to 
finance public sector deficits with their rather limited sources. The large sized 
manufacturing firms are more dependent on bank credits and thus relatively more 
sensitive to changes in bank credit conditions than the small and medium sized firms 
which rely heavily on informal credit relations such as trade credits. Supporting this view, 
the draining of the commercial bank resources available to private sector investments with 
the increase in the PSBR tend to be effective in decreasing real investments of especially 
large manufacturing firms. Beside the indirect impact of the PSBR in crowding out of real   45
investments via worsening banking system credit conditions, we observe also a direct 
financial crowding out due to the speculative demand for FA.  
The results of this paper provide a strong support to the argument that the FA may 
better be viewed not only as a financial buffer against liquidity shocks but also as a 
speculative portfolio choice substituting real investments due to their higher real rate of 
return under macroeconomic uncertainty. Enhanced macroeconomic stability decreases 
precautionary FA holdings and promotes better allocation of resources. The decrease in 
the fiscal dominance, on the other hand, not only alleviates the financial constraints that 
the corporate sector faces but also leads to a decline in the direct financial crowding out 
via the speculative motive for holding government debt instruments. This provides a firm 
level evidence based support to the postulation that fiscal contractions can be 
expansionary.     46
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